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A RATIONAL APPROACH TO
RESPONSIBILITYt
Christopher Slobogin *
LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP. By
Michael S. Moore. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1984.
Pp. xiv, 527. Cloth, $59.50; paper, $18.95.
INTRODUCTION

"Determinism" - the idea that human behavior is caused by factors beyond the individual's control - has always been a troublesome
subject for lawyers. The basis for the determinist position varies: behaviorism views human action as a mechanistic response to external
stimuli; 1 the psychoanalytic contention is that all or most behavior is
the product of unconscious drives and conflicts shaped by childhood
experiences;2 those with physiological perspectives theorize that behavior is ruled by chemical reactions in the body. 3 But regardless of
etioJogy, determinism erodes the basis for attributing personal responsibility. If an individual's behavior is caused by factors outside his
control, how can we hold him morally and legally responsible for it?
Legal scholars usually have either chosen to ignore this question4
or, in what amounts to the same thing, have posited "free will" for
legal purposes. Representative of the latter approach is the following
statement from Herbert Packer:
Very simply, the law treats man's conduct as autonomous and willed,
not because it is, but because it is desirable to proceed as if it were. It is
desirable because the capacity of the individual human being to live his
life in reasonable freedom from socially imposed external constraints
(the only kind with which the law is concerned) would be fatally impaired unless the law provides a locus poenitentiae, a point of no return

t The author would like to thank Professor Richard Bonnie of the University of Virginia
Law School and Professors Stanley Ingber and Toni Massaro of the University of Florida Law
School for their comments on earlier versions of this review.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida, Gainesville. A.B. 1973, Princeton University; J.D. 1977, LL.M. 1979, University of Virginia. - Ed.
1. See generally B. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1972); K SPENCE, BEHAVIOR THEORY AND CoNDmONING (1956).
2. See generally Freud, A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis, in 54 GREAT BOOKS OP
THE WESTERN WORLD 449 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952).
3. See generally N. CHOMSKY, RULES AND REPRESENTATIONS 217-54 (1980); Rapaport, On
the Psychoanalytic Theory of Motivation, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 173, 183212 (M. Jones ed. 1960).
4. See, e.g., W. JAMES, THE WILL TO BELIEVE 147-48 (1897).
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beyond which external constraints may be imposed but before which the
individual is free-not free of whatever compulsions determinists tell us
he labors under but free of the very specific social compulsions of the
law. 5

One way of reconciling the apparent tension between the scientific
and the legal view of persons is to jettison the notion of retributive
justice. If the idea of personal blameworthiness is meaningless, punishment could instead be premised on the need to prevent future crime
by the individual in question. 6
A less jarring resolution of the supposed conflict is to show that it
does not exist. In one of the more important recent works on the issue
of human responsibility, Professor Michael Moore of the University of
Southern California School of Law attempts to do just that. In Law
and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship, Moore concedes at the
outset that behavior can be caused by what he calls "mechanistic"
forces - physiology, the environment, and unconscious mental states.
But, arguing from a linguistic philosophical perspective, he concludes
that merely because a person's behavior is caused by such factors does
not mean that the person lacks responsibility for it. Rather, persons
are "caused causers" and therefore responsible, generally, whenever
their "actions" are the result of "practical reasoning" (terms to be defined later in this review). According to Moore, only when an actor's
ability to reason practically is impaired may he be excused for his acts.
Moore in essence is reasserting a traditional concept of personhood
that has undergone severe strain since Freud, Skinner and others have
attempted to identify the factors that predict human behavior.
In addition to this substantive thesis, Moore has a less controversial "methodological" thesis. Lawyers and psychiatrists, he argues,
both need to pay more attention to the philosophical underpinnings of
their respective professions. To the extent they lose sight of these fundamental tenets (and Moore implies that they have), interaction between the two disciplines is likely to be misfocused and the substantial
common ground between them obscured.
Critiquing Moore's substantive thesis is a gargantuan task, because
Moore himself attempts to do so much - in effect, he examines and
then recasts the principal assumptions of both the law and the behavioral sciences. Because it is the primary thrust of the book, Moore's
approach to the nature of human responsibility will be the focus of this
review. The first portion of the review will outline the philosophical
foundation for these arguments. The remainder of the review, in implicit recognition of Moore's methodological thesis, will explore the
5. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74-75 (1968).
6. See generally K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968); B. WOOTTON,
CRIME AND PENAL POLICY 220-39 (1978). A significant practical problem associated with this
approach is the difficulty in predicting dangerousness. See generally J. MONAHAN, PREDICTING
VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN AssESSMENT OF CLINICAL TECHNIQUES 21-67 (1981).
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practical implications of his ideas for criminal "mental health" law, a
rubric meant to include the insanity defense, subjective mens rea requirements, and the diminished responsibility doctrine, as well as the
admissibility of expert testimony on these issues. For the most part,
this exploration will take the form of assessing the worth of Moore's
own thoughts about the ramifications of his work. Occasionally, however, it will entail application of his substantive thesis to issues which
Law and Psychiatry considers only tangentially.

I.

PRACTICAL REASON AND HUMAN ACTION

Law and Psychiatry is a difficult book. To grasp its contents fully
will probably take more than one reading even for those with some
sophistication in the area. But the book's major tenets can be summarized briefly.
The concept which is central to Moore's thesis is that of practical
reasoning, reasoning which tells us what to do (as opposed to what to
believe). The pattern of practical reasoning can be expressed as
follows:
1. X desires q (e.g., Let it be the case that the wine be chilled).
2. X believes that doing p will produce q (e.g., If I open the window,
then the wine will be chilled).
3. X does p (e.g., I open the window).
If in fact X does p because of a desire for q and in the belief that doing
p will produce q, then, asserts Moore, we can say that p was an intentional action explained by X's belief/desire set (pp. 13-14). When a
person acts according to this type of practical syllogism, he causes an
action which is rationalized by his desires and beliefs.

Moore contends that this type of reason-giving process provides a
valid explanation of behavior, regardless of what other factors may
have contributed to the conduct. 7 He defends this contention against
several possible attacks, all of which should be examined here because
Moore's responses help one comprehend his later analysis of legal and
moral responsibility.
First, Moore must deal with the philosophical argument that reasons cannot be causes because reasons serve exclusively a rationalizing
function. Under this view, reasons are merely justifications for actions; because we prefer a rational account of human activity, each
person views his behavior as done for reasons, when in fact the reasons
are irrelevant to the causal chain. 8
To this objection, Moore makes two responses. First, for any given
action, there will presumably always be more than one belief/desire set
7. Moore himself states: "My own determinist and mechanist assumptions are that human
behavior is fully determined by mechanistic kinds of happenings in the human body," P. 33.

8. See, e.g.,
PHY

P. WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSO-

45-51 (1958).
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that can rationalize it. How are we to choose one set over another
unless through an analysis of which set we think caused the action
done (p. 23)? Second, our way of becoming aware of our reasons suggests that belief/desire sets are not mere interpretations for the sake of
convincing ourselves we are rational. Persons can know the objects of
their desires and beliefs in a "nonobservational" way; that is, they become aware of these desires and beliefs in a way an observer seeking to
justify the person's actions cannot. For instance, one can know one
wants wine to be chilled without even a silent soliloquy about that
desire. From this fact (and an assumption that physiological events
cause such nonobservational knowledge), Moore deduces that desires
and beliefs exist independently of any attempt to provide meaning to
behavior (pp. 24-25).
In my view, neither of these arguments proves that reasons cause
behavior. But taken together, they considerably weaken the interpretivist stance that reasons are mere rationalizations. More problematic
is Moore's insinuation that, assuming reasons do cause behavior, we
can conclusively ascertain those reasons. He asserts that we can discover causal desires and beliefs through the person's avowals (p. 25).
Yet he also admits, as I shall discuss in greater detail later, that a
person may act for reasons unknown to him. Moreover, in the practical context addressed in this article - the mental state of individuals
charged with crime - it is quite likely that a person's stated reasons
for acting will be suspect on other grounds. The point is not that the
interpretivist position is correct philosophically, but that when we try
to reach conclusions about the true reasons for behavior we often rely,
for lack of anything better to go on, upon observer attributions. And
when we rely upon such "observational" knowledge, we in effect become interpretivists, whether or not we think reasons cause behavior
in the abstract. Moore never confronts this dilemma squarely, but
then it is outside the scope of his book.
A quite different attack against reason-giving explanations assumes
that desires and beliefs in fact do cause behavior, but suggests that
they do not always "rationalize" it. 9 For instance, to use Moore's example, one's belief that a murderer is prowling in the hall could cause
one's heart to palpitate. The threat that this type of event poses to the
concept of practical reasoning is that, while it is caused by a belief, it
does not involve an agent pursuing intelligible ends; the end result (the
palpitation) happens irrespective of any rationalization process.
Moore admits that this type of bodily movement is not performed
for reasons, despite its being caused by a belief. But he also points out
that reason-giving explanations are only meant to explain human actions. Here, he argues, no such "action" is involved because there is
9. See, e.g., Fay, Practical ..~easoning, Rationality and the Explanation of Intentional Action.
8 J. THEORY Soc. BEHAVIOUR 77 (1978).
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not the requisite connection between the bodily movement and the actor's knowledge. Unless the actor knows he can do a particular movement and knows when he is exercising that power, the movement
cannot be called an action by the actor. Moore quotes Wittgenstein's
pithy statement to the same effect: "Human actions are marked by the
absence of surprise." 10 Given this definition, the heart palpitation in
the above example is not a human action but rather what Moore calls
a "nonaction event," just as is a reflex or an arm movement during
sleep. Nonaction events do not require rationalizations and thus do
not threaten the concept of practical reasoning (pp. 15-19). 11
One final objection to the concept of practical reasoning is the reductionist argument that reasons cannot be separated from other
causes and thus do not, by themselves, either cause or rationalize behavior. The reductionist claim comes in two forms. The behaviorist
argument is that reasons are mere constructs; they have no existence
independent of behavioral criteria because the only way to verify such
mental states is through observation of behavior. 12 The physiological
reductionist, on the other hand, argues that reasons are identical to
certain kinds of brain states. 13 If either of these contentions is correct,
then reason-giving explanations cannot be seen as causal factors separate from other factors (i.e., behavior or neuron firings), and actions,
despite the above definition, would be nothing more than bodily
movements.
With respect to the behaviorist reductionist claim, Moore's principal response is the observation that mental words such as "desire" and
"belief' are individuated by the objects they take. One does not desire
or believe in the abstract; one desires that q will occur and one believes
that doing p will cause q to occur. To speak of desires and beliefs in
any other way makes no sense (p. 38). But the behaviorist approach
cannot account for this individuation. As Moore states in one of his
other works:
One could not, for example, distinguish a desire to stand on Cicero's
grave from a desire to stand on Tully's grave on the basis of behavior of
someone tending to place himself on that grave, for Cicero and Tully
10. P. 74 (citing L. WrrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 162 (2d ed. 1958)).
For a more detailed discussion of Moore's treatment of actions, see text at notes 32-36 infra.
11. It is also possible for desires and beliefs to cause actions without rationalizing them.
Moore imagines a prisoner who rattles the bars of his cell "because he wants out." P. 16. The
bar-rattling is an action because the prisoner knows he is doing it, and the action is admittedly
"caused" by the desire to escape. Is the prisoner therefore acting for reasons? Moore would say
no, because, unlike the person who opens the window in order to chill the wine, the prisoner is
not motivated to perform his action by a desire; rather his bar-rattling merely expresses the desire
to escape. Only if the prisoner actually believed that this action would lead to escape could it be
said he acted for "reasons."
12. See, e.g., G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 83-115 (1950); Carnap, Psychology in Physical Language, in LoGICAL PosmvISM 165 (A. Ayer ed. 1959).
13. See e.g., A. GARFINKEL, FORMS OF EXPLANATION: RETHINKING THE QUESTIONS IN
SOCIAL THEORY 49 (1981); Rapaport, supra note 3, at 187-89.
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were one and the same person, and thus, there is only one grave.
An actor may desire to stand on Cicero's grave, but ignorant of the fact
that Cicero was Tully, not want to stand on Tully's grave. . .. Thus, no
equivalence may be asserted between behavioral criteria and a mental
word such as "desire."14

Even assuming this problem can be overcome, Moore points out that
behaviorists are merely stipulating, rather than proving, that behavior
is the only criterion for mental states. In fa~t, desires and beliefs may
be physiologically rooted (p. 38). Until this latter hypothesis is disproved, the behaviorist equation of mental states with behavior is
specious.
Precisely because we do not have sufficient scientific information
about the physiology of mental states, Moore has more trouble dealing
with the second reductionist argument. He admits that desires and
beliefs may in fact be identical to brain states. But he ultimately
adopts what he calls a "functionalist" perspective on mental states:
because we do not yet know whether the identity thesis is true, we can
view desires and beliefs as provisionally independent of brain states,
and thereby focus on "the role such states play in [the] person's intelligent functioning" (p. 35), rather than on how they are physically realized in that person. This assumption is crucial to Moore's approach to
responsibility, detailed in Part II of this review. It allows one to believe (as does Moore) that "mechanistic kinds of happenings in the
human body" cause human behavior (p. 33), while at the same time
permitting one to attribute causal power to belief/desire sets. Moreover, "it makes intelligible how belief/desire states could cause behavior even if such states do not turn out to be physical states of the
brain" (p. 35).
This brief recounting of Moore's arguments for viewing reasongiving explanations as legitimate explanations of human behavior does
not reveal the elaborate nature of his reasoning. But it does expose his
central premises: (1) that whether a bodily movement is an action
depends on what a person knows he can do and on what he knows
himself to be doing; and (2) that reasons (belief/desire sets) can both
cause and rationalize behavior independently of other factors. The
question now becomes what importance these conclusions have for the
moral issues faced by the criminal law.
II.

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF MOORE'S THESIS FOR THE
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW

In Moore's view, the concept of practical reasoning makes it possible for a retributive system of justice and a scientifically based determinism to co-exist. Moore's central moral assertion is that one is
14. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S.
omitted).

CAL.

L. REv. 151, 212 (1981) (footnote
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responsible for one's actions, however they are caused, so long as they
are not the result of "disturbed" 15 practical reasoning. When a person
acts for reasons, he, as a person, is the "proximate" cause of his actions. He should thus generally be held responsible for them.
Moore calls this position "soft determinism" or "compatibilism"
(p. 361). To understand the concept fully, it should be distinguished
from "hard determinism," which adopts the view that persons are
compelled to act in certain ways because of internal or external factors.16 Moore argues that compulsion and causation are two separate
concepts. Put simply, a causal factor is not a compulsion unless it
interferes with one's practical reasoning process.
Moore fleshes out this point with several examples:
That I am caused to go downtown by my desire to get a haircut is hardly
a case of compulsion. This is my uncompelled act, the product of my
undisturbed practical reasoning.
Similarly, if I am caused to engage in sharp practices by my greedy
character, this is not to say I am compelled. My greed is my characteristic way of unconstrained dealing with others in financial matters. It does
not constrain my powers of practical reasoning so much as describe how
I decide when I am unconstrained.
Similarly, there are doubtlessly large numbers of physiological states
and events necessary for each of us to engage in various kinds of basic
acts. . . . Such causes hardly disturb our practical reasonings; rather,
they are the conditions that make possible the execution of our desires in
action. 17

Finally, Moore states, "[s]imply because what a person desires or believes is caused by his environment in no way makes the exercise of
[the capacity to reason practically] difficult" (p. 364). A povertystricken childhood may lead one to believe that crime is the best way
to earn a living, which belief may in tum cause crime, but to the extent
the person with such a history retains the ability to formulate desires
and beliefs in an undisturbed fashion he cannot be said to be compelled to commit crime.
Has Moore proffered any new theoretical insight here? Or has he
merely gerrymandered the concepts of causation and compulsion? In
one sense, he, like Packer, is simply "positing" personal agency. He
admits that a soft determinist must "show that determinism is compatible with the principle that punishment is unjust unless the actor
'could have done other than he did' " (p. 488 n. 34), yet he makes no
15. Moore's conception of disturbed or invalid practical reasoning is described in this re·
view's sections on the insanity defense and the diminished responsibility notion. See Parts II.A.
& 11.D. infra.
16. For examples of this point of view, see Hospers, Free Will and Psychoanalysis, in FREE·
DOM AND RE.sPONSIBILITY: READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY AND LAW 463 (H. Morris ed. 1961);
Rapaport, supra note 3, at 187.
17. P. 363 (footnote omitted).
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attempt to do so himself. 18 All that his formulation of compulsion suggests is that only a few causal factors actually disturb practical reasoning; it does not show that in any given case a person, with or without
the capacity to reason practically, could have acted differently.
What Moore does claim to have established, as he says elsewhere in
the book, is the "possibility of there being differing sets of equally sufficient conditions existing to cause the same event" (p. 226):
To say that a bodily movement is the product of an abnormal condition
of the brain does not preclude one from describing that movement as an
action performed by an agent for reasons. We have two vocabularies:
that of movement and mechanical causation, and that of actions and
reasons. Merely because scientists may discover lesions in the brain is
not to preclude the application of the language of action and reasons.
When there are mechanically caused movements there may nonetheless
be intelligent actions. 19

Assuming (as discussed earlier) the provisional independence of
reason-giving language from the language of natural science, the next
step for Moore is an admittedly semantic one. The set of causal conditions (and vocabulary terms) which should be used to explain a bodily
movement depends quite literally on what one is talking about. If, as
is true in the law and in everyday existence, we are seeking to explain
behavior in terms of moral accountability, the language of actions and
reasons is both necessary and sufficient. The language of mechanical
causation, while it may explain behavior scientifically, is not germane
to our understanding behavior in the moral sense (p. 226). Thus,
whatever causes might be considered "compelling" in the scientific
context, in the moral context they consist only of those causes (such as
a gun to the head or addiction) which dominate one's reasons for
acting.
The linguistic approach to such issues can be attacked, of course. 20
But if we can accept the closely related propositions that reason-giving
explanations are the linchpin of responsibility analysis and that causation does not mean compulsion, then we have a powerful conceptual
tool at our disposal. It is the burden of the remainder of this review to
demonstrate this point.
A. Recasting the Insanity Defense

The area most dramatically affected by the concept of practical
reason is the insanity defense, to which Moore devotes an entire chapter. Before discussing his conclusions about the scope of the defense, it
18. However, Moore does address this issue in his most recent work, Moore, Determinism
CALIF. L. REv. (forthcoming 1985).
19. P. 226 (footnote omitted).
20. See generally A. LoUCH, EXPLANATION AND HUMAN ACTION (1966); THE LINGUISTIC
TURN: RECENT EssAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD (R. Rorty ed. 1967).

and the Excuses, 13
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is worth noting - if only because of recent antipathy toward exculpatory doctrines based on mental illness - that his thesis strongly affirms the role of the insanity defense as a necessary and integral aspect
of criminal justice. If responsibility and the ability to form practical
syllogisms are so closely connected, then one whose ability to reason
practically is significantly impaired cannot justly be held responsible.
Yet without the insanity defense, such an individual would be held
responsible for his actions. The defense is therefore central to our
view that moral agents are beings who have some capacity to act for
reasons. 21
The methodological question here, of course, is when a person's
practical reasoning ability is so impaired that responsibility cannot be
ascribed to him. One could say that the bare capacity to think in the
form of practical syllogisms is sufficient for this purpose. Thus, to
paraphrase one of the classical illustrations of insanity, if a person
desires lemon juice and believes that squeezing his wife's neck will produce the juice (because he thinks she has juice in her veins), then he
would be responsible for strangling his wife, if he in fact did so as a
result of this belief/desire set.
Moore would agree with virtually everyone else that this person is
"insane," despite the fact that his reasons caused and rationalized his
action. Where he differs from the current approach to insanity is in
his explanation of why this person should not be held morally responsible. Most states rely either on the M'Naghten test (excusing a person who because of mental disease or defect did not know the nature
and quality of his act or that the act was wrong), M'Naghten and the
so-called "irresistible impulse test," or the American Law Institute
test (excusing a person who, because of mental disease or defect, lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act or
to conform his conduct at the time of the offense to the requirements
of the law). 22 Moore argues that these tests do not capture the core
notion of why mental·disability excuses behavior. As he puts it, "there
is something about mental illness itself that precludes responsibility,
irrespective of there being any ignorance about the nature of the par21. The view that responsibility and the ability to reason practically are intimately associated
also rebuts the argument that the insanity doctrine must take into account environmental factors
such as poverty. Judge Bazelon has straightforwardly argued for such an expansion of the defense on the ground that no valid distinction can be made between actions caused by mental
illness and those caused by external factors. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S.
CAL. L. REv. 385, 396 (1976). Professor Morris, also seeing no such distinction, contends conversely that the defense should be abolished, since to allow it its logical scope would swallow the
criminal law. N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 61-63 (1982). Moore shows that
when the issue is personal responsibility rather than mere causation, external factors are irrelevant unless, as discussed above, they interfere with practical reasoning.
22. For a complete list of state and federal rules of insanity as of 1981, see Favole, Mental
Disability in the American Criminal Process: A Four Issue Survey, in MENTALLY DISORDERED
OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 247, 257-69 (J. Monahan & H.
Steadman eds. 1983).
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ticular crime or its prohibited nature, and irrespective of there being
any excuse of compulsion" (p. 230). For Moore, the distinguishing
characteristic of the mentally ill is their "irrationality":
One is a moral agent only if one is a rational agent. Only if we can see
another being as one who acts to achieve some rational end in light of
some rational beliefs will we understand him in the same fundamental
way that we understand ourselves and our fellow persons in everyday
life. We regard as moral agents only those beings we can understand in
this way. [Pp. 244-45.]

From this assertion, Moore concludes that the appropriate test for insanity is whether the accused is "so irrational as to be nonresponsible"
(p. 245).
One first notices that Moore's test lacks the "mental illness" predicate found in virtually all other insanity formulations. I think this
omission is a sensible one. The expanded definition that psychiatry
has given the term is, as he asserts, a type of "conceptual imperialism"
which results more from an effort to define the types of conditions
psychiatrists might "treat" than from a disciplined effort to grapple
with the problem of what constitutes an improperly functioning mind
(pp. 198-210).23 In light of the psychiatric baggage that now comes
with the idea of mental illness, Moore is right to eschew its use in his
definition of insanity, and to focus instead on the legally relevant
debilitating aspects of mental dysfunction.
I also believe that Moore is correct in his conclusion that "irrationality" is the aspect of mental dysfunction which excuses behavior (if
that term is appropriately defined, a problem which will be deferred
for the moment). As I shall discuss in this review's section on diminished responsibility, Moore concedes that ignorance and compulsion
due to mental abnormality - the traditional prongs of the insanity
defense - are at least partial excuses in their own right. Presumably
each might also easily lead to irrationality. But Moore argues, I think
convincingly, that it is the latter attribute which most directly undergirds our traditional notion of "mental illness," and thus our traditional notion of "insanity" (pp. 195-98). Typically, when we say a
person is mentally ill or "crazy" or "mad," we are not referring to his
knowledge of right from wrong or his ability to control his behavior,
but to the fact that his actions do not make sense in a fundamental
way. These labels apply when a person's reasons for acting are wildly
irrational - when they are difficult, if not impossible, to empathize
with. As Moore points out, the ancients' synonym for mental illness
was "loss of reason" (p. 196).
23. At times Moore seems even to suggest that the modern psychiatric definition of mental
illness should be coextensive with the law's definition of insanity. Compare pp. 207-10 with pp.
243-45. If so, he may be conflating normative and descriptive concerns. In any event, the proper
clinical parameters of mental illness is a topic far beyond the scope of this discussion of criminal
mental health law.
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Of course, there is considerable overlap between current tests of
insanity and an irrationality test. Conceptually at least, the latter test
and the cognitive formulas (M'Naghten and the first half of the ALI
rule) would seem to be almost congruent. There is a direct relationship between the rationality of one's reasons and the ability to perceive
and understand the nature or wrongfulness of what one is actually
doing. Without the latter capacities, desires and beliefs are bound to
be irrational. Moore recognizes this point when he says, "the mental
abilities of perception, memory, imagination, and particularly reasoning are necessary in the acquisition of rational beliefs and in maintaining consistency between belief sets and desire sets" (p. 197).
The same relationship does not exist, however, between an irrationality test and the volitional or control components of traditional
insanity rules (e.g., the second half of the ALI test and the so-called
"irresistible impulse" rule). While a person whose acts are "compelled" or "irresistible" is, by Moore's definition, one whose practical
reasoning is disturbed by external or internal factors, that reasoning
may still be rational. The "compelled" individual, according to
Moore, is merely one who finds it particularly difficult to avoid choosing a particular action, not one who necessarily acts for grossly irrational reasons.
If this latter point is correct, it provides theoretical support for the
current movement toward elimination of volitional impairment as an
independent component of the insanity test, 24 a movement which to
date has been bottomed more on practical concerns relating to the difficulty of proving such impairment than on solid conceptual
grounds. 25 More generally, the observations made above suggest that
an irrationality test for insanity is the most forthright manner of addressing the moral concerns which originally gave rise to the insanity
defense.
Moore's insanity formulation is thus a step forward. It suffers significantly, however, from a failure to provide an adequate definition of
rationality. Like mental illness, the term is subject to multiple interpretations, and jurors, as reliable as their intuitions may usually be, are
unlikely to reach consistent results on the issue with no guidance from
the law.
Elsewhere in the book, Moore himself implicitly recognizes this
point when he constructs a multi-level definition of rationality using
practical reasoning terminology (pp. 100-08). The least demanding
definition of a rational being is one who has "intelligible" desires and
24. See, e.g., Act of Oct. 1, 1982, ch. 143, 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws; CRIMINAL JUS'l'ICB
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-6.1 & commentary on ~(a) (First Tentative Draft 1983);
STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 10-12 (American Psychiatric Assn. 1982); see also note
52 infra.
25. It can still be argued, of course, that compulsion by reason of mental illness should be an
independent ground of excuse. But see note 55 infra and accompanying text.
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beliefs, meaning one whose desires and beliefs are not wildly "inconsisten[t] or incoheren[t] with popularly held [desires or] beliefs of a society" (p. 105). A second, more rigorous definition of rationality
requires not only that the person's desires and beliefs be intelligible but
that they be consistent with one another, at least such that the person
can identify and act upon what he most wants when faced with conflicting desires or upon what he most strongly believes when faced
with conflicting beliefs. An even more constraining requirement is
that of "transitivity," meaning that one's desires and beliefs are intelligible and free from direct contradiction and, additionally, that they
logically cohere with and are implied by one another. Finally, the
strongest sense of rationality includes the first three requirements and
adds the idea that the desires and beliefs be "correct" or "true."
Moore's dissection of the rationality concept is a decided advance
over previous efforts. 26 But his application of this framework to the
insanity inquiry is questionable. He appears to take the position that
to be sane a person must be judged rational in the first three senses,
but not in the fourth. 27 That is, if a person's desires and beliefs are
relatively intelligible, consistent with one another, and coherent, then
he is sane for legal and moral purposes; to require further that his
desires be "correct" and his beliefs "true" is not morally necessary or
appropriate. On this latter point, I agree. Otherwise, very few individuals charged with crime would be responsible; most criminal acts
spring from an obviously incorrect desire or from an untrue belief.
And where the "correctness" of the person's reasons is not obvious, it
would often be impossible to determine fairly.
On the other hand, Moore's apparent stance that to be insane a
person's reasons for acting must not only be unintelligible, but inconsistent and incoherent as well, denies clinical reality. Many psychotic
individuals, including conceivably the lemon-squeezer, have hallucinatory belief systems which are internally coherent. 28 Yet we would still
find these individuals insane.
For me, unintelligibility of reasons alone is a sufficient basis for
insanity. This concept must itself be defined, however, so as to encompass only those desires and beliefs which are inconsistent with those
held by others in the individual's societal group. Otherwise a "rational" individual from an alien or isolated subculture might be excused on insanity grounds merely for engaging in his normal, if
26. See, e.g., H. FINGARETIE & A. HAssE, MENTAL DISABILmES AND CRIMINAL RESPON218-39 (1979).
27. See p. 207.
28. This is particularly true of those psychotic individuals with paranoid disorders. See

SIBILITY

AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AssOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 197 (3d ed. 1980) (defining the essential feature of paranoia as "a permanent and

unshakable delusional system accompanied by preservation of clear and orderly thinking"); see
also descriptions of Shared Paranoid Disorder and Acute Paranoid Disorder. Id. at 197.
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sociologically rare, behavior, because of its unintelligibility to the
majority. 29
If what has been outlined above is the morally appropriate standard for the insanity defense, and I think it is, then irrationality should
be defined accordingly, rather than left open to other interpretations.
So modified the test might be:
An insane person is one who is so irrational at the time of the offense
that he is not responsible for it. Irrationality is measured by the extent
to which the desires or beliefs which motivated the offense are unintelligible in light of what the person's society commonly desires and
believes.

This test captures the essence of rationality as it should be defined
for insanity purposes and thus provides better guidance for the
factfinder than does Moore's vague formulation. It should inhibit any
tendency on the part of the factfinder to find "irrational," and thus
probative of insanity, incorrect but intelligible desires (such as a jealousy-inspired urge to kill one's spouse) or beliefs (such as a belief that
stealing is justified when you are poor). It also properly ties intelligibility to the person's cultural background, thus avoiding insanity acquittals in those infrequent cases involving desires and beliefs foreign
to the factfinder but intelligible to the defendant's subgroup. At the
same time, the test makes clear that the data relevant to the insanity
inquiry are the individual's mental states - his actual desires and beliefs - and not what one might infer from looking solely at his behavior. A poor person who robs a store may appear rational, but
determining whether he is in fact so requires an investigation of his
practical reasoning capacity.
The final difference between Moore's test and the one proposed
above may be the most important. Unlike the proposal, Moore's formulation makes no effort to tie the finding of irrationality to the offense which triggers the individual's involvement in the legal system.
It is probable that this was not an oversight on Moore's part. He criticizes current insanity tests because "[t]hey assume that legal insanity
is an excuse for the particular acts done, not a general status attached
to a class of human beings who are not accountable agents." 30 I agree
that an insane person should be excused because of the type of being
he is (a bad practical reasoner). Yet surely such a person can murder
for irrational reasons one day and rob for rational reasons the next.
Under such circumstances, the robbery should not be excused. Conversely, while there may be no such thing as truly temporary insanity,
there are "normal" people whose ability to reason practically is seri29. Cf. Rex v. Esop, 173 Eng. Rep. 203 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1836) (defendant, a native of Bagh·
dad, convicted for committing an "unnatural offence" despite argument his act was no crime in
his native land). It is conceivable that the acts of some terrorist groups would appear "unintel·
ligible" to juries in this country, yet considered in the terrorist milieu they "make sense."
30. P. 222 (emphasis in original).
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ously deficient for a short period of time; 31 if they happen to commit a
criminal act during this period, they should be excused. To the extent
that Moore's emphasis on insanity as a status leads him to ignore these
possibilities, he is inappropriately restructuring the relevant moral
inquiry.
B.

The Misnamed Voluntary Act Doctrine

Law and Psychiatry takes on many legal issues other than the insanity defense. An important issue both for its own sake and because
it sets the stage for Moore's discussion of intentionality is the scope of
the actus reus requirement. In describing this requirement, some commentators speak of the need to show the accused's act was "voluntary. "32 Use of this word can cause confusion: is someone who steals
with a gun to his head, while experiencing a strong craving for drugs
or in a last-ditch attempt to feed a starving child acting voluntarily? Is
the person who discovers his wife being beaten by a stranger acting
voluntarily when he kills the assailant in a sudden fit of rage? Traditionally, of course, none of these individuals could claim an "involuntary act" defense. Given the emphasis on practical reasoning up to
this point, a tempting rationale for this result might be to say that the
actus reus requirement is met if one moves for reasons; in fact that is
the stance many legal scholars take. 33 Yet while the thieves described
above would probably be said to be acting for reasons, the "involuntary" act claim of the impulsive killer - the person who acts "without
thinking" - is not so easily dismissed.
Moore's definition of action34 better explains why the impulsive
killer would have no actus reus claim. To Moore, the determination of
whether one is responsible for a bodily movement is primarily concerned with knowledge, and with whether an "act" can be said to have
occurred at all. Practical reasoning and the related idea of "voluntary
action" are only tangential to the inquiry.
Moore makes a standard philosophical distinction between basic
acts and complex actions. The former are those acts which do not
31. See, e.g.• the case of Joy Baker, described in P. Low, J. JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 660-69 (1982). The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual recognizes two relatively brief types of psychosis, reactive
schizophrenia (of rapid onset and brief duration with the affected individual appearing well both
before and after the schizophrenic episode), and schizophreniform disorder (clinical features
same as schizophrenia but duration ofless than six months). See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AsSOCIATION, supra note 28, at 199-202; see also description of Atypical Psychosis. Id. at 202-03.
32. See, e.g.• J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 427, 1095 (4th ed. 1873); G.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW§ 6.4 (1978); 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 54
(1881); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 25 (1972). But see H.
HART, Acts of Will and Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY 90 (1968).
33. See, e.g., J. AUSTIN, supra note 32, at 426-27; Mackie, The Grounds of Responsibility, in
LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY 175-88 (P. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977).
34. Discussed briefiy in text at notes 9-11 supra.
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require any antecedent action (such as raising one's arm) (p. 68); the
latter require a basic act or acts and some type of practical reasoning
aimed at achieving some goal (such as opening the window, driving a
car, or robbing a bank) (pp. 75-76). The so-called voluntary act doctrine is not concerned with complex actions, 35 but rather with whether
basic movements, such as raising one's arm, can morally be called the
actor's. Moore asserts that when a person's arm is blown upward by
the wind, rises because of a reflex action to some stimulus, or goes up
during sleep, we cannot say the person performed the movement. Nor
can the muscle fiexings necessary to raise one's arm be called an act,
because although the actor knows he can raise his arm he does not
"know" how to move his muscles in just the way that will raise the
arm (p. 73). But when the person knows he can raise his arm and also
knows that he is exercising that power, he is directly involved in the
bodily movement. Thus, Moore arrives at what he calls an "epistemic
indicator" of action: "An actor's bodily movement is a basic action
only if he knows that he can perform that movement as an action and
knows that he is doing so on that particular occasion" (p. 73). The
word "know" in this definition contemplates not only actual awareness of the movement at the time it occurs, but "dispositional" knowledge as well, in the sense that the person, if asked, could say that he
knows he is raising his arm on the occasion in question (pp. 339-40).
Under Moore's formulation, the impulsive killer - as well as the
threatened, addicted and desperate "property takers" described above
- meet the actus reus requirement so long as they know, in the conscious or dispositional sense, that they are going through the bodily
movements associated with killing or taking from another. On the
other hand, movements during a hypnotic trance, an epileptic attack
or sleepwalking are not acts, since they are not movements over which
the person has conscious control (p. 74). While Moore's conclusions
on these points are not departures from commonly accepted doctrine, 36 they do avoid reliance on the problematic concept of "voluntariness" as a predicate for basic action. In practice, it is extremely
rare for someone to do a basic act for no reason; theoretically, however, one can "act" even if one does not do so because of a belief/
desire set.
C. Parsing the Concept of Intention

Moore's approach to the concept of intention parallels his definition of act. One acts when one knows one can perform, and knows
35. As Moore points out, a person's responsibility for a complex action such as driving de·
pends upon whether the practical syllogism that governed the person's basic acts made reference
to the rules associated with driving. P. 76. This determination is more analogous to an analysis
of whether an act is intentional, see Part 11.C. infra, than to whether it is an "act" to begin with.
36. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE&A. Scorr,supra note 32, at§ 25; H. HART, supra note 32, at 96.
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one is performing, the movement in question. One intends the act
when one knows its consequences. To use Moore's example:
A killing will be X's action if the victim's death follows as a consequence
of some basic action performed by X, the performance of which X had
knowledge; but a killing will be X's intentional action only if death follows as a consequence of some basic action by X and X knew that it
would so follow. [P. 79.]

Several features of this formulation should be noted. First, as in the
definition of action, "knowledge" as used here does not require simultaneous conscious awareness but merely the ability to state what one
knows when one is asked to call it forth. As Moore states, "One does
not, for example, consciously think or deliberate about going to lunch,
yet doing so is an intentional action for which one may justly be held
responsible ..." (pp. 339-40). Secondly, because intentionality, like
action, is based on knowledge, it need not be the result of practical
reasoning. If one opens the window for the purpose of waving to one's
friends, but knowing that it will also chill the wine, one has, under
Moore's definition, intentionally chilled the wine even though that result was not the reason the window was opened (pp. 78-79). Moore
explains that his conclusion "is based on the moral notion that one
who does an act knowing it will lead to some bad result is equally
culpable as the person who performs that act having the bad result as
his purpose" (p. 79).
These features of Moore's approach to intentionality tend to expand the concept. But Moore would also restrict the idea in two ways.
First, he rejects the inference that one knows the consequences of one's
act merely because one did just the act that would cause those
consequences:
One's personal self does not know these [behavioral inferences] because
the extended memory, the device by which one integrates new beliefs or
other mental states into one's personal self, is not operative. This behavioral sense of knowledge or belief treats one as a purely physical system.
In this sense, like any other information-processing system with input
subsystems, one can be said to perceive and believe all sorts of things.
[P. 329.]

Similarly, Moore would not include within his definition of knowledge what might be called one's general propositional knowledge. If,
instead of being able to say, "I know that opening this window will
chill the wine," the person is only able to say, "Opening a window to a
room when it is cold outside will chill wine in the room,'' the act of
chilling the wine should not be seen as intentional. Moore points out
that equating general propositional knowledge with intention "collapses the important distinction between what one actually knew, and
what one should have known. . . . This sense of knowledge, like the
pure behavioral sense, rejects the subjective mental states required for
culpability" (pp. 330-31 ).
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Moore can be faulted for somewhat loose terminology. The last
quoted statement suggests that Moore believes one cannot be culpable
for negligence, when in fact, as he makes clear elsewhere in the book,
he actually believes that negligent omissions can make one responsible
for harm, although perhaps to a lesser degree (pp. 81-84, 342). Similarly, in his definition of intention, Moore does not seem to account for
the fact that one rarely knows the consequences of one's acts before
they occur. Rather, as modem criminal statutes recognize, the most
that can be said is that one is "practically certain" of such consequences. 37 But these oversights are not fatal to his general thesis concerning the connection between knowledge of consequences and
intention.
Perhaps a more pertinent observation is that this portion of
Moore's analysis is not particularly innovative. Many commentators
have recognized the moral distinctions he makes concerning the meaning of knowing. 38 What is creative is his effort to examine the relevance of unconscious desires and beliefs to the issue of intent.
Two preliminary questions, of course, are whether unconscious
desires and beliefs exist and whether they can be said to cause behavior. 39 Moore answers both questions affirmatively. 40 The more impor37. See, e.g.• MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("A person
acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: • • • (ii) if the element
involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will
cause such a result."). With one possible exception, see note 42 infra, Moore makes no mention
anywhere in the book of the possibility that recklessness - the awareness and disregard of a
substantial risk of harmful consequences, see MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(2)(c) (Proposed Offi·
cial Draft 1962)- might also be a basis for criminal liability. Yet "cause and effect are always
matters of probability." P. Low, J. JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, supra note 31, at 240.
38. See, e.g.• G. FLETCHER, supra note 32, at§ 6.5; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 32,
at § 28; H. HART, supra note 32, at 116-22.
39. See generally A. MACINTYRE, THE UNCONSCIOUS (1958); T. MILES, ELIMINATING THE
UNCONSCIOUS (1966).
40. According to Moore, the modern philosophical challenge to Freud's assertion that the
unconscious exists is linguistic in nature, in that it is based on an effort to discern the distinctive
features of mental words such as intentions, hopes, desires and beliefs. P. 254. A principal claim
of those that suggest there is no such thing as unconscious intentions, hopes and so on has to do
with the notion of "privileged access." See, e.g., Alston, Varieties of Privileged Access, 8 AM.
PHIL. Q. 223 (1971). True mental states, according to this theory, are those we can become
aware of in a nonobservational, noninferential way. See text following note 8 supra. Thus, we
can be said to have "privileged" access to these mental states relative to the rest of the world.
Since we cannot, by definition, have such access to any unconscious material, "the unconscious"
cannot be considered an actual mental state. See Siegler, Unconscious Intentions, 10 INQUIRY
251, 257 (1967).
Moore responds to this argument by positing the idea of "deferred" privileged access. While
we cannot be aware of unconscious material at the time it may be affecting our actions, we can,
through psychoanalysis or some other route, eventually become aware of it. What psychoanalysis can occasionally produce (at least according to Freud, supra note 2, at 626, and Moore, p.
257) is a memory of an unconscious mental state. This memory is produced by reexperiencing
the unconscious material at a conscious level. Thus, concludes Moore, unconscious mental states
exist because they have the same primary characteristic as conscious mental states - they can be
recognized in a nonobservational manner. P. 257. The mere fact that such access is deferred
does not mean that mental states so discovered could not have caused behavior.
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tant inquiry is whether unconscious mental states can ever be a motive
for acting. The argument that they cannot is based on the assertion
that one is infallible, or "incorrigible," about one's own state of mind
(at least when one sincerely makes an effort to describe that state of
mind), and thus one's conscious motives are always the true reasons
for acting. 41 But, as Moore points out, there are occasions when one is
puzzled about one's motives or does not think one has any motives at
all (p. 262). More importantly, even if one does have clearly statable
motives, and if one further assumes that they are incorrigible (which is
a questionable assumption in itself), this does not mean that they are
the person's true reasons for acting (p. 264). One could say (correctly)
that one believes one's reason for opening the window is to chill the
wine, when in fact the reason is a simultaneous (unconscious) desire to
chill an unpleasant person who is also in the room. As Moore concludes, "there is nothing suspect about attributing unconscious motives even when the subject believes his motives to be something
entirely different" (p. 265).
This conclusion has obvious implications for the insanity defense,
because under that rubric the law is interested in a person's reasons for
acting, even if they happen to be unknown to the actor at the time he
acts. But does it also mean that what appear to be consciously motivated acts may in fact be "unintentional" if it is discovered they were
unconsciously produced? To Moore, the answer to this question will
usually be no. Using his definition of intention, it should be clear that
one can "intend" one's acts even if one is ignorant of the motives behind them. Unconscious desires and beliefs are irrelevant to whether
one knows (is aware of or can, by being asked, be made aware of) the
consequences of one's basic acts. Precisely because our access to unconscious motives is "deferred," if it occurs at all, these motives do not
affect our knowledge of what our actions cause at the time they take
place. 42
·
Moore's moral justification for fixing one's conscious and dispositional knowledge as the threshold for responsibility is summed up in
the following passage:
Whatever else the principle of responsibility might include, it should include the power or ability to appraise the moral worth of one's proposed
41. Cf. R. PETERS, THE CoNCEPT OF MOTIVATION 60-61 (1960) (In many cases, conscious
reasons are "sufficient to explain what a man does; his reason coincides with the reason why he
acts.") (emphasis in original).
42. Although Moore generally believes that one should not be responsible for what one
should have known but did not know, he makes an exception for the "self-deceiver'' - the
person who (presumably unconsciously) "keeps himself' from knowing that a particular act will
cause a particular consequence. P. 331. In this sense, unconscious desires can conjinn intentionality. Arguably, the self-deception idea could encompass the idea of recklessness (which contemplates awareness of a risk and a conscious disregard thereof). See note 37 supra. Both
recklessness and Moore's self-deception idea involve the problematic distinction between actual
awareness of a risk and ignorance of a risk of which one should have been aware.
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actions. A person has such ability only if he has moral and factual
knowledge of what he is doing and is able to integrate the two to perceive
the moral quality of his action. [P. 339.]

Once a person has this moral and factual knowledge, however, he can
be responsible for his actions even if he has not engaged in practical
reasoning,43 or even if his true reasons are unconscious.
Moore expresses one reservation to this conclusion: unconscious
motivations may be relevant to intentionality when the criminal law
requires (and morality demands?) that culpability rest on some type of
practical reasoning, rather than on mere knowledge. To Moore, the
clearest examples of this type of crime are the so-called "anticipatory
offenses," such as attempt. 44 Because the conduct in such cases does
not represent a completed act, it is crucial to determine whether the
individual acted with the "purpose" of achieving (or as Moore puts it,
with the "further intent" to achieve) the end which is the subject of
criminal sanction (pp. 80-81). 45 This determination, asserts Moore,
involves ascertaining the person's reasons for acting. Even if the person charged with attempted murder consciously believed he wanted to
commit murder, he should not be guilty of attempted murder if his
real (unconscious) motive was merely to scare the purported victim (p.
371). To use the terminology of practical reasoning, the individual's
conscious belief would rationalize his action but would not cause it.
One can easily accept Moore's assertion that our conscious mental
states may not explain our actions. Everyone has experienced situations in which the reason we thought we acted was not our real reason
for acting. What is not as convincing is his apparent conclusion that
the law is interested in a person's unconscious reasons for acting when
the issue is purposive behavior. Arguably, if an individual thought he
wanted to murder the victim, the fact that his "true" reason for acting
was something short of this is irrelevant even for "specific intent''
crimes such as attempted murder. The person still thinks he is acting
from a desire to kill, which is all an assessment of culpability would
seem to require. This situation could perhaps best be analogized to
one of "factual impossibility," which under both the common law and
modem statutes is not a defense in attempt cases.46 If Moore is argu43. Virtually every intentional action, however, will be the indirect, if not the direct, result of
some form of practical reasoning, because the basic act which undergirds it will almost always, if
not always, be done for reasons.
44. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 32, at§§ 58-62.
45. Under the Model Penal Code, the mens rea for conduct associated with attempt is "purpose," defined as one's "conscious object." MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(a)(i), 5.0l(l)(a)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
46. Some controversy exists over whether criminal sanctions - specifically, those associated
with attempt - should be imposed when circumstances make a crime impossible to commit. See
generally Elkind, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts: A Theorist's Headache, 54 VA. L. REV. 20
(1968). Factual impossibility is usually distinguished from legal impossibility. An example of
the former is picking an empty pocket. Illustrating the latter is the individual who receives goods
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ing that "purpose" or "specific intent" should, on moral grounds, be
equated with motive, then his conclusions with respect to the relevance of unconscious reasons may be appropriate. But under the law
as it stands today, these conclusions are not as persuasive.
Unconscious mental states, then, will rarely, if ever, negate criminal intent. As Moore convincingly argues, however, such mental
states can mitigate responsibility even when an individual does act
intentionally.
D.

The Resurrection of a Diminished Responsibility Defense?

Diminished responsibility- the idea that a person's mental condition may reduce his responsibility for crime even though he is neither
insane nor lacking the requisite intent - has been explicit doctrine at
least since 1957, when Britain's Parliament provided, in the Homicide
Act of that year, for a conviction of manslaughter rather than murder
when a person's mental abnormality "substantially impaired his
mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or being a
party to the killing." 47 To date, however, no legislature or court decision has extended the doctrine to crimes other than homicides, 48 and
there appears to be a retreat even from this limited application. 49
While Moore's focus on practical reasoning ability and knowledge
produces conservative formulations of insanity and intention, respectively, his willingness to consider the possibility that unconscious
mental states can affect behavior leads him to consider, if not forthrightly recognize, what most legislatures and courts have rejected: a
"partial" defense based on ignorance or compulsion caused by mental
dysfunction. As to the former, he hypothesizes that some individuals,
believing (incorrectly) that they are stolen. See Booth v. State, 398 P.2d 863, 870-72 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1965). Although the common law usually permitted a defense in cases oflegal impossibility, the Model Penal Code denies a defense in both situations. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 5.0l(l)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). In the attempted murder example in the text, the
individual is unaware that it is "factually impossible" for him to complete the offense, just as the
pickpocket is not aware, before he reaches into the empty pocket, that his crime is impossible.
47. 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, Ch. 11, Part I, § 2(1).
48. P. Low, J. JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, supra note 31, at 815.
49. The califomia Supreme Court appeared to adopt a version of the diminished responsibility idea in People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 821, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964) (holding
that a first degree murder conviction requires a finding that the defendant "could maturely and
meaningfully reflect upon" the killing) (emphasis in original), but the California legislature has
since passed a statute declaring that "[t]o prove the killing was 'deliberate and premeditated,' it
shall not be necessary to prove the defendant maturely and meaningfully reflected upon the gravity of his or her act." CAL. PENAL CoDE § 189 (Deering Supp. 1985).
The Model Penal Code permits a finding of manslaughter for what would otherwise be murder if the homicide "is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. . . • [R]easonableness •.. shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he
believes them to be." MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.3(l)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Even
under this liberal formulation, a quasi-objective standard is imposed, reflecting some discomfort
with open-ended inquiries into mental states short of insanity. But see text at notes 68-69 infra.
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because of unconscious mental states, may be emotionally ignorant of
the normal consequences of their actions. With respect to compulsion,
he suggests that unconscious desires can make the choice between lawabiding and criminal behavior particularly hard for some people.
To illustrate these points, Moore uses the facts of United States v.
Pollard, so which involved a police officer who robbed or attempted to
rob a string of stores and banks. Psychiatrists testified that Mr. Pollard, who claimed that he chose to rob for the money, was actually
"governed" by an unconscious urge to be punished for the death of his
first wife and child, both of whom had been brutally murdered by a
neighbor when Pollard was not home. Although Moore emphasizes
that the psychiatric evidence presented in the case was extremely
weak, he hypothesizes that Pollard could have been experiencing a
high level of anxiety before and during the time of the offense, stemming from his unconscious belief that he had caused the death of his
wife and child. This anxiety, Moore suggests, could have rendered
him unable to appreciate, in an emotional sense, that he was endangering innocent lives, even though he knew, in a dispositional sense, that
he carried a gun. His complex action of robbing the bank would still
be intentional (because he knew that robbery was what he was doing),
but he would not be fully cognizant of nor desire its consequences,
thus making him less responsible for it (p. 368). 5 1
Alternatively, Pollard could have been compelled to rob by his unconscious desires. Again, Moore hypothesizes that if Pollard's "unconscious guilt and consequent need to be punished truly explain his
action of robbing the banks, then it may have been very difficult for
him to act in any way but to alleviate this guilt feeling" (p. 378). If
such were the case, the unconscious mental states would not merely
cause the crime but make the choice to remain law-abiding an especially hard one. 52
50. 171 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Mich. 1959), revd., 282 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1960).
51. Moore does not explain how this variant of diminished responsibility differs from unconscious self-deception about the consequences of one's acts, which he suggests should confirm
culpability, not reduce it. See note 42supra. He analogizes the latter situation to the legal notion
of"willful blindness,'' p. 331, which perhaps entails a keener awareness of the high probability of
risk in one's actions than exists in the hypothesized Pollard case. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(7) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is
an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability
of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist."). But the distinction is a subtle
one at best, and thus particularly troubling, because the validity of a diminished responsibility
claim could rest upon it.
52. Moore admits that "[t]he compulsion sufficient to excuse will be difficult to determine
since it is a matter of degree and relative to the gravity of the offense." P. 378. Thus, although
Moore may have better conceptualized the notion of compulsion, he has not provided any practical way of distinguishing between compulsion and mere causation. Many other writers have
concluded that such a distinction is impossible to make, at least in most cases. Professor Bonnie
has written:
[T]here is no scientific basis for measuring a person's capacity for self-control or for calibrating the impairment of that capacity. There is, in short, no objective basis for distin-
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Moore speaks of emotional ignorance as an "affirmative excuse"
(p. 368), and of unconscious compulsion as an "excuse in its own
right" (p. 374). Whether he means to imply by this language that the
type of evidence described above should be considered at trial is unclear. My own feeling is that, consistent with what was said earlier in
the context of the insanity defense, such evidence should only be exculpatory to the extent that it suggests gross irrationality. Unless the
factfinder believes, first, that the unconscious desires or beliefs do motivate the defendant's actions and, second, that they are unintelligible,
they should not be considered exculpatory.
At least two arguments - one persuasive, the other much less so
- can be advanced to support this position. Most fundamentally, diminished responsibility evidence which does not suggest irrationality
is no more important on a moral scale than many other variants of
compromised, but still rational, functioning which the law does not
consider relevant in adjudicating guilt. For example, the panicky parent who steals for his starving child and the addict who robs due to
physiological cravings are generally not excused for their behavior despite their significantly disturbed practical reasoning. 53 Yet, to the extent such phenomena can be measured, the parent is probably as
emotionally ignorant and the addict as compelled as the individual
who acts for unconscious reasons in the situations hypothesized by
Moore. If the law is not willing to accord exculpatory significance to
the disturbed practical reasoning of the former individuals, it should
not do so for Pollard unless his reasons for acting were unintelligible. 54
guishing between offenders who were undeterrable and those who were merely undeterred,
between the impulse that was irresistible and the impulse not resisted, or between substantial
impairment of capacity and some lesser impairment.
Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194, 196 (1983); see also Morse,
Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis ofMental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 527,
589 (1978) ("We simply do not and cannot have a scientifically proven answer to the question of
whether crazy persons or normal persons have free will."); Wootton, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J.
1019, 1027 (1968) ("[I]t is not only difficult to devise a test of volitional competence the validity
of which can be objectively established: it is impossible."). Even the American Psychiatric Association has stated:
The line between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted is probably no sharper
than that between twilight and dusk. • • • The concept of volition is the subject of some
disagreement among psychiatrists. Many psychiatrists therefore believe that psychiatric testimony (particularly that of a conclusory nature) about volition is more likely to produce
confusion for jurors than is psychiatric testimony relevant to a defendant's appreciation or
understanding.
STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 11 (1982).
53. The parent obviously intends the act. He could claim necessity or duress, on the ground
that his act was the lesser of two evils (because otherwise the child would die). See W. LAFAVE
& A. SCOTT, supra note 32, at§ 49. Yet if the parent could be seen as having choices other than
theft, if the child's death were not imminent, or if the parent's action was in any other way an
unreasonable response to the threat of starvation, no defense would be available. Id.
Likewise, a claim that addiction compelled a theft will usually be considered only at sentencing, if at all. "[T]here is no discernible trend toward recognizing a defense in such a case." Id. at
§ 45.
54. If Pollard, due to emotional disassociation, truly believed that he did not have a gun in
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Where the law does, and should, freely consider all such individualized factors is at sentencing. ss
A second ground for prohibiting evidence concerning unconscious
mental states at trial is a practical one: because such evidence deals
with slippery notions of "emotional appreciation" and "compelling
guilt," it should be tolerated only at the less formal sentencing stage.
Precisely this kind of evidence, however, is commonly introduced at
trial under current insanity tests. S 6 Even under Moore's insanity formulation, testimony about unconscious mental states would be relevant to the extent they truly explain an agent's actions and are
irrational (p. 373). For that matter, virtually any trial evidence about
subjective mental states is of suspect reliability. To prohibit similar
consideration of diminished responsibility evidence on uncertainty
grounds alone would throw into question other inquiries that Moore
and others have noted are clearly pertinent to the issue of guilt.
Therefore, the sole legitimate rationale for restricting questions of diminished responsibility to sentencing is the moral ground advanced
above.
I do not mean to imply that the difficult proof problems associated
his hand or that he was withdrawing money from his own account in a polite and nonthreatening
manner, then it may be that his beliefs were so irrational as to make him nonresponsible. Alternatively, if Pollard truly believed (consciously or unconsciously) that robbing banks was the only
way in which he could be punished for his wife's death, then perhaps a jury would find his
motivations and beliefs at the time of the offense to be so unintelligible that he should be found
insane.
55. See, e.g., MODEL SENTENCING AND CoRRECTIONS Acr § 3-108, 10 U.L.A. 277 (Supp.
1980-83).
I realize I am glossing over the fact that some forms of compulsion, e.g., volitional impairment due to mental illness and duress, are considered at trial rather than at sentencing, and that
an argument can thus be made that all "compulsions" should be considered at the former stage.
Indeed, there is a strong intuitive appeal to the idea that a person who finds it very hard to keep
from doing a particular act is not responsible for it. But I think a reasonable limitation, using the
justification rationale, can and should be placed on the mitigating effect of compulsion. The
limitation would be as follows: regardless of how compelled one feels to make the choice to
commit crime, an intelligible choice to do so is justifiable only when it prevents a greater crime.
To illustrate this stance, a defense would exist in the classical "gun to the head" scenario if the
harm prevented (e.g., murder of the defendant) is a greater crime than the harm committed (e.g.,
robbery by the defendant). But tlie addict or kleptomaniac is not preventing a crime by giving in
to his craving; rather, he is attempting to avoid personal pain. Thus, I would argue, he should
not have a defense.
I base this approach on the premise that the primary aim of the criminal law is to punish
those who choose to commit crime. If this is the case, then a person's choice to commit crime is
excused only when the reasons for doing so are unintelligible. If the person's choice is intelligible,
it is justified only when the alternative choice is committing a greater crime. All other choices to
commit crime should be punishable. However, the degree of difficulty in making these other
choices can and should be considered at the sentencing stage.
56. See, e.g., the American Law Institute's insanity test, which states, "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements oflaw." MODEL PENAL CoDE § 4.01(1)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). This test is used in over half the states. See Favole, supra note
22, at 257-69.
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with criminal mental health law issues can be ignored. Indeed, once
the appropriate forum for addressing these issues has been fixed, the
manner in which they are addressed should become paramount. Understandably, given the philosophical nature of his effort, Moore pays
scant attention to the technical task of gathering useful evidence concerning the various inquiries he concludes are relevant. But the law
does not have this luxury. In order to round out the discussion of the
implications of Moore's thesis for criminal mental health law, the remaining substantive section of this review examines how these inquiries can best be answered. More specifically, it looks at the role mental
health professionals should play in addressing these issues.
Ill.

THE USEFULNESS OF PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY IN CRIMINAL
CASES

Traditionally, the law has turned to mental health professionals to
help it address the questions about mental states raised by the insanity
defense, the diminished responsibility notion, and the act requirement.
To a lesser extent, it has also sought clinical expertise in making mens
rea determinations. Moore's conceptualization of responsibility would
curtail clinical testimony about unconscious mental states in the latter
two contexts. 57 And in all of these contexts, it would place limits on
evidence about characterological, physiological, or external factors
which merely "cause" behavior rather than affect the capacity to act
intentionally or act for reasons. 58 But even if one adopts Moore's ap57. See text at notes 35-36 & 41-45 supra.
Evidence about unconscious mental states may be relevant to the insanity and diminished
responsibility inquiries. Should such evidence be admissible even when the actor's conscious
mental states appear to explain his actions quite adequately? Moore seems to think so, though he
does state: "For seemingly quite rational actors, . . . one may be more suspicious of the truth of
the psychoanalytic explanations in terms of their unconscious mental states." P. 373 (emphasis in
original).
A more restrictive rule of thumb might be that whenever one's conscious desires and beliefs
do not seem rational in the transitive sense, see text preceding note 26 supra, the law should
permit investigation into unconscious mental states. It will be recalled that under Moore's formulation, the transitive sense of rationality contemplates desires and beliefs that are implied by
one another. Although he is speaking of all reasons for acting, not just conscious ones, the idea
could perhaps be confined to conscious reasons for the sole purpose of establishing a threshold
for determining when unconscious reasons are material for legal purposes. Thus, in Pollard, if it
could be shown that Pollard both consciously wanted to rob banks for the money and in addition
consciously believed he did not need money, the factfinder would be entitled to evidence concerning unconscious mental states, since it would be quite possible that those states, and not the
conscious ones, would be the true explanations for the behavior.
58. See text at notes 15-20 supra. In Moore's view much of what is currently common in
clinical testimony - evidence about the defendant's childhood, employment "stressors" or
"character'' - would probably be immaterial to criminal mental health issues. The practical
problem, of course, is determining when a pl\rticular factor is irrelevant to understanding a person's unconscious mental states, knowledge at the time of the offense, or difficulty in making a
particular choice. See note 52 supra. Given this problem, Moore's conceptual limitation may
not have a major impact on the types of clinical evidence considered admissible.
As one illustration of this point, take evidence about an individual's character. Moore states
that an individual's character does not "constrain his choices in the way in which a gun at his
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proach to criminal health law, considerable latitude remains for opinions from mental health professionals.
The principal question has been not whether psychiatric testimony
is relevant in criminal cases, but whether its usefulness is outweighed
by its lack of trustworthiness. 59 It is generally conceded that mental
health professionals are better than laypersons at gathering the behaviorial data relevant to criminal law questions. 60 It is also agreed by
most, if not all, that clinicians should be prohibited from offering opinions about the moral issues the jury alone is supposed to address. 61
The controversy centers on the extent to which clinicians should be
allowed to provide the factfinder with inferences derived from their
behavioral observations which fall short of trenching upon the ultimate legal question.
There are in essence two arguments which have been advanced in
favor of excluding such clinical inferences from criminal trials. The
first is that these inferences are so speculative that they are lacking in
probative value. The second is that, even if they do have some probative worth, they add nothing to what the factfinder can discern for
itself once it has access to the relevant behavioral data.
There is no doubt that clinical theories, and opinions based upon
them, are generally suspect. Stephen Morse's conclusion about psychodynamic formulations - that "external, empirical investigations
have produced, at best, only equivocal and pallid confirmations of
Freud's theory" 62 - could probably well be applied to most psychiatric and psychological theories. But in the context at issue here when the defendant wishes to rely on clinical testimony to raise a
doubt as to the culpability of his mental state - a blanket prohibition
on theory-based psychiatric evidence should not be countenanced. All
that the evidentiary formulation should require (and all that the fedhead would. . . . [R]ather, characters are themselves constructs created by generalizing about
what one does when one's choices are unconstrained." P. 88. Yet, in addition to this "evaluational character," Moore also admits the existence of an "appetitive character," which can compel actions. Pp. 440 n.123, 488 n.41. He provides no useful way of differentiating between the
two concepts, with one result that even under his approach testimony about character is not
likely to be restricted appreciably. Moreover, even if character testimony is not generally material to compulsion issues, it could easily be relevant to intent. See, e.g., United States v. Staggs,
553 F.2d 1073, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 1977) (testimony by psychologist that defendant was more
likely to hurt himself than others held relevant on issue of ability to form intent to assault with a
deadly weapon).
59. See generally J. ZISK.IN, CoPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY
(2d ed. 1975); Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. R.Ev. 427, 466-95 (1980); Morse, supra note
52, at 601-11; Comment, The Psychologist as Expen Witness: Science in the Courtroom?, 38 Mo.
L. R.Ev. 539 (1979).
60. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 52, at 611-19.
61. See, e.g.• CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-3.9(a), 7-6.6 (First Tentative Draft 1983); Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 59, at 456-57; Morse, supra note 52, at 602-03.
62. Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the Unconscious, 68
VA. L. R.Ev. 971, 1014 (1982).
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eral rules do require) 63 is that such testimony have some tendency to
prove a fact at issue, 64 and that it come from a qualified professiona165
who has followed adequate evaluation procedures66 and who avoids
addressing issues which are outside his specialized knowledge67 (such
as whether the defendant is morally and legally accountable).
This stance is based on two separate justifications, one normative,
the other evidentiary. First, as Professor Bonnie and I have argued
elsewhere,
The law's tolerance for speculation and imprecision varies according to
the context and consequence of the inquiry. When a defendant claims
that his psychological aberration has, or ought to have, exculpatory or
mitigating significance, the risk of unreliable decisionmaking is often accepted in deference to the perceived ethical imperatives of
individualization. 68

Thus, for instance, modem formulations of excusing conditions such
as insanity and diminished responsibility (including Moore's) provide
only "that degree of specificity necessary to give the jury adequate
normative guidance regarding the nature of the question being
63. See Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 97, 128-48 (1984) (discussing FED. R. Evm. 401, 403, 702, 703, 704).
64. The basis of admissibility for any evidence is relevance, which is defined by FED. R.
Evm. 401 to mean "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Clinical evidence which is material, see notes 57-58 supra, and which is presented by
appropriately qualified professionals, see notes 65-67 infra, will generally meet this test, which
only requires that evidence rise above mere speculation. See James, Relevancy, Probability and
the Law, 29 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 689, 690-91 (1941).
Relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. Evm. 403.
The factors listed in Rule 403 will generally not apply when the defendant is presenting expert
testimony in criminal cases because, for reasons discussed in the text at notes 70-75 infra, one
purpose for admitting such testimony is to combat undue prejudice against the defendant asserting a claim of mental abnormality.
65. FED. R. Evm. 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise." In the context at issue here, the proffered witness would need
to show both educational and experiential qualifications relating to the study of human behavior
in order to meet this requirement. For a more detailed description of these qualifications, see
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 59, at 457-61.
66. FED. R. Evm. 703 appears to require an investigation into evaluation procedures because
it states that the facts or data upon which an expert opinion or inference is based must be "of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject." Given the speculative nature of the endeavor, it is imperative that the expert
attempt to assess past mental state in as rigorous a manner as possible. See Bonnie & Slobogin,
supra note 59, at 504-22 (suggesting methods of maximizing the reliability of clinical assessment).
67. FED. R. Evm. 704 states: "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact." However, if the "ultimate issue" is one that is moral rather than scientific in nature (as is
the case with the issue of whether a person is "insane"), then Rule 702 would bar such testimony
because it is not based on "specialized knowledge." See note 65 supra.
68. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 59, at 434-35.
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asked." 69 The vagueness of these doctrines implies a tolerance for
some amount of imprecision in applying them to specific cases. Individualization under standards such as these would be frustrated if the
defendant were forced to forgo using the informed speculation of experts and to rely instead solely on his own statements and those of lay
witnesses.
A second, independent justification for permitting clinical testimony rests on an admittedly debatable perception of the realities of
criminal adjudication. The perception is that, despite the "presumption of innocence" accorded criminal defendants, 70 in fact a judge or
jury is likely to assume just the opposite. After all, the factfinder
might reason, the state would not have gone to the trouble of prosecuting the defendant were he not guilty. Anyone who has read a newspaper account of the latest indictment or arrest can understand this
notion. 71 Of course, an instruction that the prosecution must prove all
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt may have a powerful
effect on an otherwise biased factfinder. 72 And when the defendant is
claiming he did not commit the actus reus for the crime, objective evidence is usually available to overcome any predisposition to convict
the defendant. But when the defendant admits he committed the
criminal act, which he in effect does by asserting a mental defense, the
type of evidence which he can present in support of his case is more
subjective, more amorphous, and more likely to be seen as self-serving
than evidence relating to the actus reus.73 Under these circumstances,
69. Id. at 435 n.17.
70. As LaFave and Scott have pointed out, the so-called presumption of innocence is actually
not a presumption at all because it does not contemplate the typical logical pattern of a presump·
tion, namely that once an underlying fact has been proved, another fact may (or must) be taken
as proved. It is in fact an instruction to the jury designed to counteract the fact that the defendant has been accused. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 32, at§ 8.
71. Professors Saks and Kidd conclude that there is a considerable amount of evidence suggesting the existence of a "hindsight effect." As the authors describe this phenomenon, "input
information is perceived as far more predictive of the outcome once the outcome is known than
when the outcome is still in doubt.'' Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & SocY. R.Ev. 123, 143-44 (1980-81). They suggest that a
criminal trial may produce this effect because the factfinder is given the "answer" - the defendant - before it is asked to consider the evidence and decide whether the evidence proves the
suggested conclusion that the defendant committed the act charged. Id. at 145.
72. Id.
73. As Professor Bonnie and I have said in the context of testimony on mens rea:
In a criminal case involving subjective mens rea requirements, the prosecution usually has
no direct evidence concerning the defendant's state of mind; it must rely on "common
sense" inferences drawn from the defendant's conduct. This has the practical effect of shifting the burden to the defendant to demonstrate that he did not perceive, believe, expect, or
intend what an ordinary person would have perceived, believed, expected, or intended under
the same circumstances. Restriction of clinical testimony on mens rea thus compromises
the defendant's opportunity to present a defense on an issue concerning which he, in reality,
bears the burden of proof. The factfinder is likely to view with considerable skepticism the
defendant's claim that he did not function as would a normal person under the circumstances..•• By precluding the defendant from offering relevant expert testimony, the law
unduly enhances the prosecution's advantage on this issue.
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a restrictive standard of proof provides decidedly less protection
against unwarranted assumptions. Indeed, the jury is often told that it
may infer or presume intent from the mere fact the defendant acted. 74
The defendant should not be forced to rebut this presumption (which
exists in fact even when it is not given de jure status) without the aid of
expert testimony, even if the reliability of such testimony is not verified. The expert functions as a bias rebutter; he helps redress the inequality that would otherwise exist due to the natural tendency to infer
intentional, rational action. 7 s
For these reasons, psychiatric testimony about past mental state
which meets the evidentiary stipulations described earlier should not
be barred solely because it is of questionable trustworthiness. Nor
should it be barred because of the critics' second argument - that
clinical opinion testimony does not assist the factfinder and is therefore not "expert." If the testimony is in fact based on knowledge or
skill which is "specialized" it will, by definition, add to what the
factfinder can discover for itself. Occasionally, the basis of the expert's
opinion may not meet this threshold test; 76 in such cases it should be
excluded. But on a topic as complex as the human mind, any incremental addition to the factfinder's knowledge should be permitted.
And surely, increasing a jury's exposure to alternative perspectives is
helpful.
Moore does not dwell on these issues. To the extent one can discern his attitude about the reliability or helpfulness of clinical testimony, he appears to be ambivalent. He cites Morse's negative review
of Freudian theory with approval (p. 279), and at one point suggests
that to the extent psychiatrists subscribe to the hard determinist view77
their testimony about unconscious mental states will be of little value
(p. 364). But he also states that even in the problematic area of comBonnie & Slobogin, supra note 59, at 477. To a lesser extent, similar conclusions could be drawn
with respect to the de facto burden of proof in insanity and diminished responsibility cases.
74. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 32, at§ 28 ("a maxim much used in criminal
law cases states that a person is 'presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his
acts.'"); J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 251 la (3d ed. 1949). But see Sandstrom v. Montana, 442
U.S. 510 (1979) (holding that it is a violation of due process to give jury an instruction which has
the effect of shifting the burden on the mens rea issue; however, jurors may be told they may infer
intent from such acts).
75. Cf. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome
Issue and its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395 (1985)
(arguing that evidence of rape trauma syndrome should be admissible in part to overcome
preconceptions of jurors about rape); cf. Slobogin, supra note 63, at 145-48 (arguing that strong
assumption on the part of a factfinder that person subjected to commitment or sentencing proceedings is dangerous justifies prohibiting presentation of clinical evidence to prove dangerousness unless defense elects to do so).
76. For instance, testimony that a person is compelled may exceed the bounds of professional
knowledge. See note 52 supra.
77. See text at note 16 supra.
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pulsion, "the law may get some help from psychiatry" (p. 379).78 Assuming appropriately qualified testimony, the law should not refuse
this help.
CONCLUSION

This review of Michael Moore's Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking
the Relationship has focused on the book's rich implications for criminal mental health law. It has not touched upon several other interesting facets of Moore's work which both lawyers and mental health
professionals may find of interest. Lawyers, for instance, should find
enlightening his overview of the civil law from the perspective of linguistic philosophy (pp. 44-112). Mental health professionals may benefit from his analysis of psychoanalytic explanation (pp. 281-309).
Both groups should find useful his attack on the Szaszian notion that
mental illness does not exist (pp. 155-216) and his discussion of the
thesis that each of us is composed of multiple selves (pp. 387-415).
If there is a significant flaw to the book, it is that its usefulness is
somewhat diminished by its density and occasional lack of clarity. If
Moore's methodological objective of prodding lawyers and mental
health professionals into reexamining their assumptions is to be realized, philosophical treatment of their respective disciplines must be
approachable. A major aim of this review has been to unpack what
Moore has said about criminal mental health law and describe it in
more accessible terms.
This criticism should not obscure the fact that Law and Psychiatry
is a remarkable achievement. Although many of its chapters were
written as separate articles over a period of thirteen years and "were
not originally produced with the intent of joining them as a book with
a single theme" (p. xi), the work is a coherent exegesis of the philosophical underpinnings of both law and psychiatry. It should stand as
a major contribution to the field for years to come.

78. Moore uses as an example of this possibility testimony about kleptomania. He suggests
that if psychiatrists can tie the kleptomaniac's urge to steal to strong sexual feelings, the
factfinder, drawing upon its own fund of experience in the latter area, might "begin to understand what it would be like to experience what kleptomaniacs experience before and as they
steal." P. 379.

